27/2/09

Antonio Gramsci, "Intellectuals and Hegemony".

Antonio Gramsci

1. Intellectuals and Hegemony

Every “essential” social group which emerges into history out of the preceding economic
structure, and as an expression of a development of this structure, has found (at least in all of
history up to the present) categories of intellectuals already in existence and which seemed
indeed to represent an historical continuity uninterrupted even by the most complicated and
radical changes in political and social forms.
The most typical of these categories of intellectuals is that of the ecclesiastics, who for a long
time (for a whole phase of history, which is partly characterised by this very monopoly) held a
monopoly of a number of important services: religious ideology, that is the philosophy and
science of the age, together with schools, education, morality, justice, charity, good works, etc.
The category of ecclesiastics can be considered the category of intellectuals organically bound
to the landed aristocracy. It had equal status juridically with the aristocracy, with which it
shared the exercise of feudal ownership of land, and the use of state privileges connected with
property.[B] But the monopoly held by the ecclesiastics in the superstructural field[C] was not
exercised without a struggle or without limitations, and hence there took place the birth, in
various forms (to be gone into and studied concretely), of other categories, favoured and
enabled to expand by the growing strength of the central power of the monarch, right up to
absolutism. Thus we find the formation of the noblesse de robe, with its own privileges, a
stratum of administrators, etc., scholars and scientists, theorists, non-ecclesiastical philosophers,
etc.
Since these various categories of traditional intellectuals experience through an “esprit de
corps” their uninterrupted historical continuity and their special qualification, they thus put
themselves forward as autonomous and independent of the dominant social group. This selfassessment
is not without consequences in the ideological and political field, consequences of
wide-ranging import. The whole of idealist philosophy can easily be connected with this
position assumed by the social complex of intellectuals and can be defined as the expression of
that social utopia by which the intellectuals think of themselves as “independent”, autonomous,
endowed with a character of their own, etc.
One should note however that if the Pope and the leading hierarchy of the Church consider
themselves more linked to Christ and to the apostles than they are to senators Agnelli and
Benni[5] the same does not hold for Gentile and Croce, for example: Croce in particular feels
himself closely linked to Aristotle and Plato, but he does not conceal, on the other hand, his
links with senators Agnelli and Benni, and it is precisely here that one can discern the most
significant character of Croce’s philosophy.
What are the “maximum” limits of acceptance of the term “intellectual"? Can one find a
unitary criterion to characterise equally all the diverse and disparate activities of intellectuals
and to distinguish these at the same time and in an essential way from the activities of other
social groupings? The most widespread error of method seems to me that of having looked for
this criterion of distinction in the intrinsic nature of intellectual activities, rather than in the
ensemble of the system of relations in which these activities (and therefore the intellectual
groups who personify them) have their place within the general complex of social relations.
Indeed the worker or proletarian, for example, is not specifically characterised by his manual or
instrumental work, but by performing this work in specific conditions and in specific social
relations (apart from the consideration that purely physical labour does not exist and that even
Taylor’s phrase of “trained gorilla"[6] is a metaphor to indicate a limit in a certain direction: in
any physical work, even the most degraded and mechanical, there exists a minimum of
technical qualification, that is, a minimum of creative intellectual activity.) And we have
already observed that the entrepreneur, by virtue of his very function, must have to some degree
a certain number of qualifications of an intellectual nature although his part in society is
determined not by these, but by the general social relations which specifically characterise the
position of the entrepreneur within industry.
All men are intellectuals, one could therefore say: but not all men have in society the
function of intellectuals.[D]
When one distinguishes between intellectuals and non-intellectuals, one is referring in reality
only to the immediate social function of the professional category of the intellectuals, that is,
one has in mind the direction in which their specific professional activity is weighted, whether
towards intellectual elaboration or towards muscular-nervous effort. This means that, although
one can speak of intellectuals, one cannot speak of non-intellectuals, because non-intellectuals
do not exist. But even the relationship between efforts of intellectual-cerebral elaboration and
muscular-nervous effort is not always the same, so that there are varying degrees of specific
intellectual activity. There is no human activity from which every form of intellectual
participation can be excluded: homo faber cannot be separated from homo sapiens.[7] Each man,
finally, outside his professional activity, carries on some form of intellectual activity, that is, he
is a “philosopher”, an artist, a man of taste, he participates in a particular conception of the
world, has a conscious line of moral conduct, and therefore contributes to sustain a conception
of the world or to modify it, that is, to bring into being new modes of thought.
The problem of creating a new stratum of intellectuals consists therefore in the critical
elaboration of the intellectual activity that exists in everyone at a certain degree of
development, modifying its relationship with the muscular-nervous effort towards a new
equilibrium, and ensuring that the muscular-nervous effort itself; in so far as it is an element of
a general practical activity, which is perpetually innovating the physical and social world,
becomes the foundation of a new and integral conception of the world. The traditional and
vulgarised type of the intellectual is given by the man of letters, the philosopher, the artist.
Therefore journalists, who claim to be men of letters, philosophers, artists, also regard
themselves as the “true” intellectuals. In the modern world, technical education, closely bound
to industrial labour even at the most primitive and unqualified level, must form the basis of the
new type of intellectual…
The relationship between the intellectuals and the world of production is not as direct as it is
with the fundamental social groups but is, in varying degrees, “mediated” by the whole fabric
of society and by the complex of superstructures, of which the intellectuals are, precisely, the
“functionaries”. It should be possible both to measure the “organic quality” [organicità] of the
various intellectual strata and their degree of connection with a fundamental social group, and
to establish a gradation of their functions and of the superstructures from the bottom to the top
(from the structural base upwards). What we can do, for the moment, is to fix two major
superstructural “levels": the one that can be called “civil society”, that is the ensemble of
organisms commonly called “private”, and that of “political society” or “the State”. These two
levels correspond on the one hand to the function of “hegemony” which the dominant group
exercises throughout society and on the other hand to that of “direct domination” or command
exercised through the State and “juridical” government. The functions in question are precisely
organisational and connective. The intellectuals are the dominant group’s “deputies” exercising
the subaltern functions of social hegemony and political government. These comprise:
1. The “spontaneous” consent given by the great masses of the population to the general
direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group; this consent is
“historically” caused by the prestige (and consequent confidence) which the dominant group
enjoys because of its position and function in the world of production.
2. The apparatus of state coercive power which “legally” enforces discipline on those groups
who do not “consent” either actively or passively. This apparatus is, however, constituted for
the whole of society in anticipation of moments of crisis of command and direction when
spontaneous consent has failed.
This way of posing the problem has as a result a considerable extension of the concept of
intellectual, but it is the only way which enables one to reach a concrete approximation of
reality. It also lashes with preconceptions of caste. The function of organizing social hegemony
and state domination certainly gives rise to a particular division of labour and therefore to a
whole hierarchy of qualifications in some of which there is no apparent attribution of directive
or organisational functions. For example, in the apparatus of social and state direction there
exist a whole series of jobs of a manual and instrumental character (non-executive work, agents
rather than officials or functionaries).[11] It is obvious that such a distinction has to be made just
as it is obvious that other distinctions have to be made as well. Indeed, intellectual activity must
also be distinguished in terms of its intrinsic characteristics, according to levels which in
moments of extreme opposition represent a real qualitative difference — at the highest level
would be the creators of the various sciences, philosophy, art, etc., at the lowest the most
humble “administrators” and divulgators of pre-existing, traditional, accumulated intellectual
wealth…
The methodological criterion on which our own study must be based is the following: that
the supremacy of a social group manifests itself intwo ways, as ‘domination’ and as
‘intellectual and moral leadership’. A social group dominates antagonistic groups, which it
tends to ‘liquidate’, or to subjugate perhaps even by armed force; it leads kindred and allied
groups. A social group can, and indeed must, already exercise ‘leadership’ before winning
governmental power (this indeed is one of the principal conditions for the winning of such
power); it subsequently becomes dominant when it exercises power, but even if it holds it
firmly in its grasp, it must continue to ‘lead’ as well…
…there does not exist any independent class of intellectuals, but every social group has its
own stratum of intellectuals, or tends to form one; however, the intellectuals of the historically
(and concretely) progressive class, in the given conditions, exercise such a power of attraction
that, in the last analysis, they end up by subjugating the intellectuals of the other social groups;
they thereby create a system of solidarity between all the intellectuals, with bonds of a
psychological nature (vanity, etc.) and often of a caste character (technico-juridical, corporate,
etc.). This phenomenon manifests itself ‘spontaneously’ in the historical periods in which the
given social group is really progressive—i.e. really causes the whole society to move forwards,
not merely satisfying its own existential requirements, but continuously augmenting its cadres
for the conquest of ever new spheres of economic and productive activity. As soon as the
dominant social group has exhausted its function, the ideological bloc tends to crumble away;
then spontaneity may be replaced by ‘constraint’ in ever less disguised and in direct forms,
culminating in outright police measures and coups d’etat…
2. Revolution in the West
It is the problem of the relations between structure and superstructures which must be
accurately posed and resolved if the forces which are active in the history of a particular period
are to be correctly analysed and the relation between them determined. Two principles must
orient the discussion: 1. that no society sets itself tasks for whose accomplishment the necessary
and sufficient conditions do not either already exist or are not at least beginning to emerge and
develop; 2. that no society breaks down and can be replaced until it has developed all the forms
of life which are implicit in its internal relations. From a reflection on these two principles, one
can move on to develop a whole series of further principles of historical methodology.
Meanwhile, in studying a structure, it is necessary to distinguish organic movements (relatively
permanent) from movements which may be termed ‘conjunctural’ (and which appear as
occasional, immediate, almost accidental). Conjunctural phenomena too depend on organic
movements to be sure, but they do not have any very far-reaching historical significance; they
give rise to political criticism of a minor, day-to-day character, which has as its subject small
ruling groups and personalities with direct governmental responsibilities. Organic phenomena
on the other hand give rise to socio-historical criticism, whose subject is wider social groupings
— beyond the people with immediate responsibilities and beyond the ruling personnel. When a
historical period comes to be studied, the great importance of this distinction becomes clear. A
crisis occurs, sometimes lasting for decades. This exceptional duration means that incurable
structural contradictions have revealed themselves (reached maturity), and that, despite this, the
political forces which are struggling to conserve and defend the existing structure itself are
making every effort to cure them, within certain limits, and to overcome them. These incessant
and persistent efforts (since no social formation will ever admit that it has been superseded)
form the terrain of the ‘conjunctural’, and it is upon this terrain that the forces of opposition
organize. These forces seek to demonstrate that the necessary and sufficient conditions already
exist to make possible, and hence imperative, the accomplishment of certain historical tasks
(imperative, because any falling short before a historical duty increases the necessary disorder,
and prepares more serious catastrophes). (The demonstration in the last analysis only succeeds
and is ‘true’ if it becomes a new reality, if the forces of opposition triumph; in the immediate, it
is developed in a series of ideological, religious, philosophical, political and juridical polemics,
whose concreteness can be estimated by the extent to which they are convincing, and shift the
previously existing disposition of social forces.)
A common error in historico-political analysis consists in an inability to find the correct
relation between what is organic and what is conjunctural. This leads to presenting causes as
immediately operative which in fact only operate indirectly, or to asserting that the immediate
causes are the only effective ones. In the first case there is an excess of ‘economism’, or
doctrinaire pedantry; in the second, an excess of ‘ideologism’. In the first case there is an
overestimation of mechanical causes, in the second an exaggeration of the voluntarist and
individual element. (The distinction between organic ‘movements’ and facts and ‘conjunctural’
or occasional ones must be applied to all types of situation; not only to those in which a
regressive development or an acute crisis takes place, but also to those in which there is a
progressive development or one towards prosperity, or in which the productive forces are
stagnant.) The dialectical nexus between the two categories of movement, and therefore of
research, is hard to establish precisely. Moreover, if this error is serious in historiography, it
becomes still more serious in the art of politics, when it is not the reconstruction of past history
but the construction of present and future history which is at stake. One’s own desires and one’s
baser and more immediate passions are the cause of error, in that they take the place of an
objective and impartial analysis — and this happens not as a conscious ‘means’ to stimulate to
action, but as self-deception. In this case too the snake bites the charlatan — in other words the
demagogue is the first victim of his own demagogy.
The same reduction must take place in the art and science of politics, at least in the case of
the most advanced states, where ‘civil society’ has become a very complex structure and one
which is resistant to the catastrophic ‘incursions’ of the immediate economic element (crises,
depressions, etc.). The superstructures of civil society are like the trench-systems of modern
warfare. In war it would sometimes happen that a fierce artillery attack seemed to have
destroyed the enemy’s entire defensive system, whereas in fact it had only destroyed the outer
perimeter; and at the moment of their advance and attack the assailants would find themselves
confronted by a line of defense which was still effective. The same thing happens in politics,
during great economic crises. A crisis cannot give the attacking forces the ability to organize
with lightning speed in time and in space; still less can it endow them with fighting spirit.
Similarly, the defenders are not demoralized, nor do they abandon their positions, even among
the ruins, nor do they lose faith in their own strength or their own future. Of course, things do
not remain exactly as they were; but it is certain that one will not find the element of speed, of
accelerated time, of the definitive forward march expected by the strategists of political
Cadornism.[2]
The last occurrence of the kind in the history of politics was the events of 1917. They
marked a decisive turning-point in the history of the art and science of politics. Hence it is a
question of studying ‘in depth’ which elements of civil society correspond to the defensive
systems in a war of position. The use of the phrase ‘in depth’ is intentional, because 1917 has
been studied — but only either from superficial and banal viewpoints, as when certain social
historians study the vagaries of women’s fashions, or from a ‘rationalistic’ viewpoint — in
other words, with the conviction that certain phenomena are destroyed as soon as they are
‘realistically’ explained, as if they were popular superstitions (which anyway are not destroyed
either merely by being explained).
The question of the meagre success achieved by new tendencies in the trade-union
movement should be related to this series of problems.[3]
One attempt to begin a revision of the current tactical methods was perhaps that outlined by
L. Dav. Br. [Trotsky] at the fourth meeting, when he made a comparison between the Eastern
and Western fronts. The former had fallen at once, but unprecedented struggles had then
ensued; in the case of the latter, the struggles would take place ‘beforehand’.[4] The question,
therefore, was whether civil society resists before or after the attempt to seize power; where the
latter takes place, etc. However, the question was outlined only in a brilliant, literary form,
without directives of a practical character.
It should be seen whether Bronstein [Trotsky]’s famous theory about the permanent character
of the movement[5] is not the political reflection of the theory of war of manoeuvre (recall the
observation of the Cossack general Krasnov) — i.e. in the last analysis, a reflection of the
general-economic-cultural-social conditions in a country in which the structures of national life
are embryonic and loose, and incapable of becoming ‘trench or fortress’. In this case one might
say that Bronstein, apparently ‘Western’, was in fact a cosmopolitan — i.e. superficially
national and superficially Western or European. Ilyich [Lenin] on the other hand was
profoundly national and profoundly European.
Ilyich, however, did not have time to expand his formula — though it should be borne in
mind that he could only have expanded it theoretically, whereas the fundamental task was a
national one; that is to say it required a reconnaissance of the terrain and identification of the
elements of trench and fortress represented by the elements of civil society, etc. In the East the
state was everything, civil society was primordial and gelatinous; in the West, there was a
proper relation between state and civil society, and when the state trembled a sturdy structure of
civil society was at once revealed. The state was only an outer ditch, behind which there stood a
powerful system of fortresses and earthworks: more or less numerous from one state to the next,
it goes without saying — but this precisely necessitated an accurate reconnaissance of each
individual country.
Bronstein’s theory can be compared to that of certain French syndicalists on the general
strike, and to Rosa’s theory in the work translated by Alessandri. Rosa’s pamphlet and theories
anyway influenced the French syndicalists, as is clear from some of Rosmer’s articles on
Germany in Vie Ouvriere (first series in pamphlet form). It partly depends too on the theory of
spontaneity.
The Transition from the War of Manoeuvre (Frontal Attack) to the War of Position—in the
Political Field as well
This seems to me to be the most important question of political theory that the post-war
period has posed, and the most difficult to solve correctly. It is related to the problems raised
by Bronstein [Trotsky], who in one way or another can be considered the political theorist of
frontal attack in a period in which it only leads to defeats. This transition in political science is
only indirectly (mediately) related to that which took place in the military field, although
certainly a relation exists and an essential one. The war of position demands enormous
sacrifices by infinite masses of people. So an unprecedented concentration of hegemony is
necessary, and hence a more ‘interventionist’ government, which will take the offensive more
openly against the oppositionists and organize permanently the ‘impossibility’ of internal
disintegration—with controls of every kind, political, administrative, etc., reinforcement of the
hegemonic ‘positions’ of the dominant group, etc. All this indicates that we have entered a
culminating phase in the political-historical situation, since in politics the ‘war of position’,
once won, is decisive definitively. In politics, in other words, the war of manoeuvre subsists so
long as it is a question of winning positions which are not decisive, so that all the resources of
the State’s hegemony cannot be mobilized. But when , for one reason or another, these
positions have lost their value and only the decisive positions are at a stake, then one passes over
to siege warfare; this is concentrated, difficult, and requires exceptional qualities of patience
and inventiveness. In politics, the siege is a reciprocal one, despite all appearances, and the
mere fact that the ruler has to muster all his resources demonstrates how seriously he takes his
adversary.

MRzine (Monthly Review), 19/06/06


On Neoliberalism: An Interview with David Harvey

by Sasha Lilley



Neoliberalism has left an indelible, smoldering mark on our world for the last thirty years. Eminent Marxist geographer David Harvey, author of A Brief History of Neoliberalism (Oxford, 2005), spoke earlier this year to Sasha Lilley, of the radical radio program Against the Grain, about the origins and trajectory of the neoliberal creed.

SL: Could you give us a working definition of "neoliberalism" -- a term that's particularly confusing to people in the US who associate liberalism with socially progressive policies?

DH: There are two things to be said. One is, if you like, the theory of neoliberalism and the other is its practice. And they are rather different from each other. David HarveyBut the theory takes the view that individual liberty and freedom are the high point of civilization and then goes on to argue that individual liberty and freedom can best be protected and achieved by an institutional structure, made up of strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade: a world in which individual initiative can flourish. The implication of that is that the state should not be involved in the economy too much, but it should use its power to preserve private property rights and the institutions of the market and promote those on the global stage if necessary.

SL: Talk about the intellectual origins of neoliberal thought associated with the Austrian economist Friedrich von Hayek.

DH: Liberal theory goes back a very long way, of course, to the 18th century: John Locke, Adam Smith, and writers of that sort. Then economics changed quite a bit towards the end of the 19th century and neoliberalism is a really revival of the 18th century liberal doctrine about freedoms and individual liberties connected to a very specific view of the market. And the leading figures in that are Milton Friedman in this country and Friedrich Hayek in Austria. In 1947 they formed a society to promote neoliberal values called the Mont Pelerin Society. It was a minor society but it got a lot of support from wealthy contributors and corporations to polemicize on the ideas it held.

SL: Did this group see their role as promoters of these ideas in the political realm?

DH: They took the view that state interventions and state domination were something to be feared. And they weren't only talking about fascism and communism, but they were also talking about the strong welfare state constructions that were then emerging in Europe in the postwar period and also talking about any kind of government intervention into how the market was working. They saw their role as very political, not only against fascism and communism, but also against the power of the state, and particularly against the power of the social democratic state in Europe.

SL: The welfare state was characterized by a compact of sorts between labor and capital, the idea of a social safety net, a commitment to full employment -- you call this "embedded liberalism." Up until the 1970s it was supported by most elites. Why was there a backlash against the welfare state and the push for a new political economic order in the 1970s that gave rise to the political implementation of neoliberal thought?

DH: I think there were two main reasons for the backlash. The first was that the high growth rates that had characterized the embedded liberalism of the1950s and 1960s -- we had growth rates of around 4 percent during those years -- those growth rates disappeared towards the end of the 1960s. That had a lot to do with the stresses within the US economy, where the US was trying to fight a war in Vietnam and resolve social problems at home. It was what we call a guns and butter strategy. But that led to fiscal difficulties in the United States. The United States started printing dollars, we had inflation, and then we had stagnation, and then global stagnation set in in the 1970s. It was clear that the system that had worked very well in the 1950s and much of the 1960s was coming untacked and had to be constructed along some other lines. The other issue which is not so obvious, but the data I think show it very clearly, is that the incomes and assets of the elite classes were severely stressed in the 1970s. And therefore there was a sort of class revolt on the part of the elites, who suddenly found themselves in some considerable difficulty, for economic as well as for political reasons. The 1970s was, if you like, a moment of revolutionary transformation of economies away from the embedded liberalism of the postwar period to neoliberalism, which was really set in motion in the 1970s and consolidated in the 1980s and 1990s.

SL: What do you think was the underlying reason for the falling rate of profit in the 1970s, the symptoms of which you've just described?

DH: There were a number of other reasons connected with it. The postwar compromise had certainly empowered labor and labor organizations and therefore labor contracts were relatively favorable for those who were in the privileged unions and again that put certain stresses in the system. That is, if wages go up, profits tend to go down. So there was an element of that in the situation in the 1970s as well. In many ways the neoliberal argument that the labor market should be flexible and open and free of any union constraints became very appealing in the 1970s, as you can imagine.

SL: The intellectual fathers -- and I think they were primarily fathers -- of neoliberalism clustered around monetarist Milton Friedman at the University of Chicago had a chance to put their ideas into action following the US-backed coup against the socialist Allende government in Chile in 1973. I wonder if you could tell us about this -- the first application of neoliberalism to a country's economy.

DH: This arose after the coup against the socialist, democratically elected government under Salvador Allende and Pinochet and the others were faced with the dilemma of how to reconstruct the economy along lines that would revive it. For a couple of years they didn't know what to do and then Pinochet turned to a business elite in Chile that had been very important in the coup, and who had established relationships with economists who were Chilean but who had been trained in Chicago under Milton Friedman. Those economists came into government in 1975 and completely restructured the government under neoliberal lines, which meant privatization of all state assets except -- in the Chilean case -- copper, opening the country to foreign investment, not preventing any repatriation of profits out of the country. So it just opened the country to foreign capital and opened everything to the privatization, including, interestingly in the Chilean case, the privatization of social security, which we have been hearing about in this country over the last year.

SL: What were the consequences for both the Chilean people and the accumulation of capital in Chile following those reforms?

DH: It went very well for a few years and then ran into serious problems in 1982. But when I say it went very well, it went very well for the political and economic elite. It was one of those situations where the country seemed to do well, but the people were doing very badly because of course after the coup all labor organizations had been destroyed, all social welfare structures had been dismantled. For the general population things did not go very well, but for elite they went very well, and for foreign investors things went very well for few years. And then they ran into a serious crisis and it was at that point that they started to realize that neoliberal theory in its pure form didn't necessarily work that well. And there were some major adjustments that occurred in the theory after that, which led into a different kind of neoliberalization practice.

SL: A second example of the application of at least some of the ideas associated with neoliberalism came about in New York City in the mid-1970s which then provided lessons for neoliberalism. Tell us about New York City's fiscal crisis and how it was resolved, as it were.

DH: In the New York case, the city was heavily indebted for a variety of reasons which are rather complicated to go into. And at a certain point in 1975, the investment bankers in the city decided not to roll over the debt, that is, they decided not to fund New York City debt any more. Now, I don't think this was an application of neoliberal theory; I think it was the way in which the investment bankers were beginning to think about the city. And it was a kind of major experiment, in which the investment bankers took over the budgetary structure of the city. It was a financial coup as opposed to a military coup. And they then ran the city the way they wanted to do it and the principles they arrived at was that New York City revenues should be earmarked so that the bondholders were paid off first and then whatever was left over would go to the city budget. The result of that was that the city had to lay off a lot workers, had to cut back on municipal expenditures, had to close schools and hospital services, and also had to make user charges on an institution like CUNY, which up until that point was tuition-free. What the bankers did was to discipline the city along ways which I think they didn't have a full theory for, but they discovered neoliberalism through their practice. And after they had discovered it, they said, ah yes, this is the way in which we should go in general. And of course this then became the way that Reagan went and then it became, if you like, the standard way the International Monetary Fund starts to disciple countries that run into debt around the world.

SL: You argue that a major shift in political economic practices, such as neoliberalism, could not come about -- at least in democracies like the US and United Kingdom -- without some degree of consent, not just from traditional elites but also the middle classes. How was this consent engendered in the 1970s?

DH: There was a concerted program that worked at a number of levels. To me, the beginning point was a memo that Lewis Powell, who became Supreme Court justice shortly afterwards, sent to the American Chamber of Commerce in 1971. What he said, in effect, was that the anti-business climate in this country has gone too far, we need a collective effort to try to turn it around. After that we see the formation of a whole set of think tanks, the massing of money by various organizations to try to influence public policy and to do it through the media, do it through think tanks. We also see the formation in 1972 of something called the Business Roundtable, which was a very influential organization. They were very concerned to try to roll back that legislation which had emerged during the 1960s and early 1970s that set up things like the Environmental Protection Agency, OSHA, consumer protection, and all of those sorts of things. And of course they gained considerable influence in the press through the Wall Street Journal and business pages and business schools and the like, and through their think tanks they started to influence public opinion. But then they also needed to be able to get a hold of the political process. This was a very interesting process where the Political Action Committees that got set up in the 1970s were very active and there was a tremendous formation of them and they started to get together collectively to fund the Republican Party. So what we see is the corporate takeover of the Republic Party along neoliberal lines, conservative lines, rather than the liberal Republicans like the Rockefellers, who were the old style Republicans. There was a takeover by Reagan and people like that in the 1970s of the Republican Party. But then the Republican Party needed a mass base and one of the things that then happened was that they turned to the Christian Right, and remember it was Jerry Falwell in 1978 who formed the Moral Majority, and there was a coalition that then emerged, a popular base amongst the evangelical Christians on the one hand and then tremendous corporate funding of the political process on the other hand, which made the Republican Party solidly behind the neoliberal agenda.

SL: You write that a fundamental feature of neoliberalism is the disciplining and disempowerment of the working class. Paul Volcker, who headed up the Federal Reserve first under Carter and then under Reagan, played a pivotal role in doing this in the United States. Describe for us the conditions in the US in the 1970s -- the array of class forces, so to speak, at that time -- and how Paul Volcker played a crucial role in shifting the balance of power.

DH: There had been, during the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s, a steady process of deindustrialization, that is, the loss of manufacturing jobs. It was a slow process and in many areas of the country that process was held back by an increase in public expenditures. This was true, for instance, in New York City. Manufacturing jobs had been drained away but public service jobs were booming. And that meant that public funding was needed for that. The federal government -- the Federal Reserve -- had a policy that full employment was a very worthwhile, very important objective of public policy. What Paul Volcker did in 1979 was to reverse that, to say, we're no longer interested in full employment; what we're interested in is control of inflation. He brought inflation down quite savagely in about three or four years, but in the process he generated massive unemployment. And massive unemployment of course was disempowering for workers and at the same time the deindustrialization that I mentioned accelerated. So there was quite a massive loss of industrial jobs, manufacturing jobs, in the early 1980s. And of course that means less union power. If you close down the shipyards and the steel industry lays off people, then you have fewer people in the unions. The loss of jobs in the unionized sector disempowered the unions at the same time unemployment was rising; unemployment disciplines the labor force to accept lower paying jobs if necessary. So Volcker's shift away from full employment strategy at the Federal Reserve to control inflation, no matter what the impact on unemployment, was a major shift in public policy and which we still implement.

SL: That attack on unionized employment was epitomized by British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, whose Conservative Party came to power in May of 1979. Thatcher famously said that "there is no such thing as society, only individual men and women." I wonder if youcould talk about the politics in the UK in the mid and late 70s, the power of the unions and the way that elites responded to that power -- and what Thatcher did in response.

DH: The unions in Britain, of course, were very strong and there was a very large public sector. Embedded liberalism in Britain involved the nationalization of coal, steel, transportation, telecommunications, and the all rest of it. The unions were relatively strong in the 1970s but again there was a lot of economic pressure in Britain and it ran into very serious problems in the mid-1970s. The Labour government really didn't have a good way to solve them. So the Labour government started to push for austerity in the public sector. The result of that was a huge wave of public sector strikes in 1978 and that created considerable discontent in the country in general. Margaret Thatcher came to power with a mandate really to control union power, and that is what is what she effectively did by an almost pure neoliberal strategy. Most famously of course, she took on the most powerful union in British history, both politically and sentimentally, which is the miners' union. There was a huge strike in 1984 which she fought through to victory for herself. That was, if you like, the beginning of the end of the real strong power of the labor movement. After that she privatized steel, she privatized automobiles, she privatized coal mining, she privatized pretty much everything in the British economy at some point. She wanted to privatize national health, but she never managed quite to do that.

SL: She also attacked municipal government, which was a stronghold of the left in the UK.

DH: She faced significant opposition to her program by the fact that most of the large city governments were controlled by the Labour Party. And the Labour Party was not going to play ball with her program at that level. So when she started to cut funds to the local municipalities, what they did was to increase the local taxation and still keep their programs in place. What she then did was to cap the amount of local taxation they could take and that way she was involved in this huge struggle with Labour governments. In Liverpool, for example, the council there refused to cap their expenditures or their taxes and she had to have them put in jail for disobeying the national law. So there was a huge struggle on a municipal level. Eventually she reformed -- tried to reform -- all local finances around something called the poll tax and there was again huge resistance to this, so there was struggling going on over municipal financing in Britain in the 1980s under Margaret Thatcher as she tried to impose her will on recalcitrant municipal governments.

SL: You write of the years 1979 to 1980 as a key moment for the ascendancy of neoliberalism, the Volcker shock that you spoke of earlier, the rise of Margaret Thatcher, take place during this time. Another event took place around those years, in 1978 in fact: the Chinese Communist Party under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping embarked on a path of economic liberalization that ultimately massively transformed the Chinese economy. You argue this event was connected in its own way to the rise of neoliberalism -- how so?

DH: I think what we have to look at here is a concordance of events. It's hard to see the reforms in China were triggered by events in Britain or events in the United States. Nevertheless, the liberalization in China set China off into a market-based kind of socialism, which then found a way to integrate into the global economy in ways that I think would not have been possible in the 1950s or 1960s. Because neoliberalization, in so far as it opens up the market, globally as well as within nations, in so far as it did that, it gave the Chinese an opportunity to suddenly venture into the global market in ways that could not easily be controlled from elsewhere. I think the reforms in China were initially meant to try to empower China in relationship to what was going on in Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore. The Chinese were very aware of these developments and wanted to compete in some ways with those economies. Initially, I don't think the Chinese wanted to develop an export-led economy, but what their reforms led to was the opening up of industrial capacity in many parts of China, which then found themselves able to market their commodities on the world stage, because they had very cheap labor, very good technology, and a reasonably educated labor force. Suddenly the Chinese found themselves moving into this global economy, and, as they did so, they gained much more in terms of foreign direct investment, so suddenly China started getting involved in this neoliberalization process. Whether it was by accident or design, I don't really know, but it certainly has made a huge difference to how the global economy is working.

SL: Break down the chain of events that helped facilitate the process of developing countries becoming beholden to institutions like the IMF and the World Bank which dictated neoliberal policies, starting with the OPEC oil crisis of the early 1970s and the petrodollars that were produced by those countries in the Middle East that had oil.

DH: There's a very interesting story to be told about that and I'm not sure it has been fully elaborated upon yet. With the OPEC oil price hike in 1973, a vast amount of money was being accumulated by the Saudis and other Gulf states. And then the big question was: well, what's going to happen to that money? Now, we do know that the US government was very anxious that that money be brought back to New York, to be circulated back into the global economy via the New York investment banks, and persuaded the Saudis to do that. Why the Saudis were persuaded to do it remains a bit of a mystery. We know from British intelligence sources that the US was actually prepared to invade Saudi Arabia in 1973, but whether the Saudis were told: recycle the money through New York or you get invaded . . . who knows? Now, the New York investment banks then had vast amounts of money. Where were they going to invest it? The economy wasn't doing very well at all in 1974-75, as, all over, it was in depression. [Citibank head] Walter Wriston came up with the following comment, that the safest place to invest the money is in countries, because countries can't disappear -- you always know where they are. And so they started to make the money available to many countries like Argentina, Mexico, Latin America was very popular, but also places like Poland even. They lent a lot of money to those countries. That worked out quite well for a while, but then in 1982 there was this general fiscal crisis, particularly after Volcker had raised the interest rate. What this meant was that the Mexicans who had borrowed money at 5 percent were now having to pay it back at 16 percent or 17 percent, and they found they couldn't do it. Mexico was about to go bankrupt in 1982. That was the point at which neoliberalism kicked in. The US, via the International Monetary Fund and the US Treasury, said: we'll bail you out, but we'll bail you out on condition that you start to privatize and open up the country to foreign investment and start to adopt a neoliberal stance. Initially the Mexicans really didn't do that very much, but by the time you get to 1988 they start to do it sort of big time. But here's the interesting thing: it's unreasonable to think that actually the US imposed neoliberalization on Mexico. What happened was that the US was putting noeliberalizing pressures on Mexico and an elite inside of Mexico seized the opportunity to say: yes, that's what we want. So it was a coalition between the elite in Mexico and the US Treasury/IMF that put together the kind of neoliberalization package that came to Mexico in the late 1980s. And actually if you look at the pattern, it's very rare for there to be a straight imposition of neoliberalizing policies through the IMF or the US. It's nearly always an alliance between an internal elite, as it had been in Chile, and US forces that put this thing together. And it's the internal elite who are as much to blame for neoliberalization as the international institutions.

SL: That point turns on its head a lot of the assumptions the left tends to make about neoliberalism being imposed on countries by the United States. One of the cases where this also was illustrated was Sweden, which had one of the most socialistic welfare states, and where ruling elites forced through neoliberal policies.

DH: There was a really serious threat to the ownership structure in Sweden during the 1970s, in effect, there was a proposal to buy out ownership entirely and turn it into a sort of worker-owned democracy. The political elites in Sweden were horrified by this and fought a tremendous battled against it. The way they fought was partly, again, through ideological mechanisms. The bankers controlled the Nobel Prize in economics, that went to Hayek, went to Friedman, that went to all the neoliberal figures to try to give legitimacy to all the neoliberal arguments. But then also the Swedes organized themselves as a confederacy of industrial magnates, organized themselves, built think tanks and the like. And every time there was any kind of crisis or difficulty in the Swedish economy, and all of these economies run into difficulties at some point or other, they would really push the argument: the problem is the strength of the welfare state, it's the huge expenditures of the welfare state. But they never actually managed to make it work too well. So they came up with the interesting strategy of going into the European Union, because the European Union had a very neoliberal structure -- through the Maastricht Treaty -- so the Swedish Confederation persuaded everyone they should go into Europe, and then it was the European rules that allowed the more neoliberal policies to be introduced into Sweden in the 1990s. It hasn't gone very far in Sweden because the unions are still very strong and the political history is very strong over social democracy and the like. But, nevertheless, there has been a process towards a limited neoliberalization in Sweden as a result of the activities of these political elites and their strategy of taking Sweden into Europe.

SL: You write that neoliberalism play two roles: either to restore high rates of profitability for capitalism or to restore the power of the capitalist ruling class. Explain that distinction for us and why they don't necessarily go together.

DH: The first burst of neoliberalization in the 1970s and early 1980s occurred in a situation of very low rates of capital accumulation, and therefore the general argument was made that we need to change the way the economy is organized in order to get growth back on track. That was the general argument that was made. Now, the difficulty was, that actually the first part of the Reagan administration was in serious economic crisis, Margaret Thatcher didn't do very well in terms of transforming the economy there, and as I mentioned in the Chilean case, things didn't work out too well in Chile either by the time you get to the early 1980s. Neoliberalism was not doing very well in its pure form, in terms of regenerating capital accumulation, but what it was doing very well was redistributing wealth towards the upper classes. You see in all of the data now, that from the late 1970s onwards, those countries that turned towards neoliberalization actually achieved tremendous increases in the wealth of the elites. In this country, for example, the top one percent tripled its share of the national income from about 1970 to say 2000. And of course it's doing even better now under the tax rules that the Bush administration is implementing. Mexico was another case where in a short period after neoliberalization, suddenly fourteen or so people appeared on the Forbes billionaires list globally -- suddenly billionaires erupted in Mexico. The market shock therapy that was given to Russia after the collapse of the wall ended up with seven oligarchs controlling about 50 percent of the economy. So wherever neoliberalization moves, you see this tremendous concentration of wealth and power occurring in the top echelons. It actually occurs in the very, very top echelons -- in the 0.01 percent. For instance, there was a little piece in the New York Times the other day that said: what's happened to the four hundred richest people in this country over the past twenty years? And it turns out they were worth $600 million a piece in constant dollars back in about 1985 and they are now worth something like $2.8 billion. They have quadrupled their wealth over this period. What neoliberalization has been very good at is restoring or reconstituting class power in a very narrow band of the political economic elite.

SL: You argue that neoliberalism functions by redistributing wealth, as you've just said, rather than generating it in the first place, what you call "capital accumulation by dispossession" rather than accumulation by the expansion of wage labor. Can you explain for us some of the many forms that accumulation by dispossession can take?

DH: Accumulation by dispossession is to me a very important concept. And it doesn't simply apply in the periphery of the global capitalist economy. For example, in Mexico, the reform of the land system there, privatizing land, has forced many peasants off the land. The result is the land has gone into few people's hands. So you get concentration of wealth and power in agriculture in Mexico going on very fast and the creation of a landless proletariat as a result. Now, in this country we have analogous things going on in terms of what's happening to family farming. That lot of family farmers can no longer make it and they're being taken over by agribusiness. One of the mechanisms there, of course, is through indebtedness, that people borrow, they get into debt, they can't pay off their debts, and in the end they have to sell out sometimes at rock bottom prices. Accumulation by dispossession takes many local forms. I think, for example, the whole use of eminent domain in this country to dispossess people of their housing is a very good example of this. But then also we have the loss of pension rights. People who thought they had very good pensions with United Airlines suddenly find they don't because the company went bankrupt and then shed its pension obligations. The same thing happened through Enron and the like. So there's a tremendous amount of dispossession of wealth and assets going on around the world. And then when you ask yourself the question, how is it, for instance, that healthcare has become less and less affordable in this country, more and more people are being dispossessed of the right to healthcare? You ask yourself the question, who is getting rich in this situation? Well, it's those very, very small elite who are getting so much money they don't know what to do with it. You look at the Wall Street bonuses, or something of that kind, you say, how come they're getting bonuses of millions of dollars when people are losing their healthcare? And I want to say we have to connect those things. Things are going on in this country where people are being dispossessed, and things are going on in China where people are being dispossessed of their rights, there's dispossession going on in Africa, as people are being deprived of their resources, the genetic materials which are around them are being patented by corporations. There's a general kind of process of dispossession going on which I think is very important to look at politically and to resist politically as much as we can.

SL: Dispossession, at least on a global scale, makes one think of empire. What is the relationship between neoliberalism and imperialism?

DH: Imperialism today is very different from the sort of imperialism that existed at the end of the 19th century, say in Britain and France, and so on. Imperialism today does not work through actual active control of territories. The single exception to that, of course, is the venture in Iraq, which is rather different; it's a sort of reversion to an ancient style of imperialist venture. But what this means is that, for instance, the US is an imperialist country, it has an imperialist agenda, and the way it has sought to gain its power is by a double strategy. First you try to gain power by economic influence, by economic power, by economic institutions, so that the fact that the United States controls the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, the fact that it can actually work through those institutions, that it can exercise immense economic influence and power, is one of the means by which US imperial strategies operate. The US can force markets open in countries, through things like the WTO, through things like bailing out Mexico or bailing out South Korea. So the economic influence is very important. The other strategy, which has been longstanding in US imperial history, is to find a local strong person -- usually a man, a strong man -- who will do your bidding and you will support him and you will give him assets and give him military assistance. This is what they did in Nicaragua in the 1920s and 1930s and they found Somoza -- the older Somoza. This is what they did with the Shah of Iran in the coup that deposed a democratically elected government. This is what they did in Chile with Pinochet, again deposing a democratically elected government. The US has had this indirect form of imperialism through these two mechanisms of vast economic power and also through these characters who are supported through the coups that the US supports. So this has been the US imperial strategy. Now, it connects to neoliberalization in the following way: that when the investment bankers in New York got all that money in the mid-1970s and started investing it in say Mexico and so on, it became very important that whoever was in government in Mexico was friendly to the United States. If they were not friendly to the United States and also if Mexico got into debt, then of course you could use your economic power to make sure that you had a friendly government there. So neoliberalization connects to this imperial strategy in very specific ways. In particular now, it's very mixed in with the way in which financial institutions operate.

SL: We've seen a bit of a shift in US policy with the rise of neoconservatism, which is epitomized by the architects of the invasion of Iraq. These neoconservatives differ from neoliberals to the extent that they appeal to a need for order and morality, rather than individualism, freewheeling cultural expression, and the chaos that the market can bring. So would it be fair to say that neoconservatives are in still favor of the market, have a great deal in common with neoliberals, but just want a greater degree of social control?

DH: I think that's the way I would put it. I think that neoliberalism is a pretty contradictory form, it's not stable, and so there's a tremendous volatility that occurs through neoliberalization. That volatility means there's a good deal of insecurity and a good deal of uncertainty, and I think out of that comes a wish to somehow or other get on top of the market monster and impose some order on it from the center, and to do it by military force if necessary. I think the neoconservatives have taken that view very strongly. And I think they have also taken the view that the market ethic, in so far as it's an anything-goes ethic in itself, also needs to be countered by the imposition of some kind of moral purpose upon what this is all about. The neoconservatives are very much in favor of the market, it's not as if Bush and Cheney and Wolfowitz are not in favor of market processes or restoration of class power, or anything of that kind, they're very much in favor of it. But they recognize that the neoliberals' way of doing it is unstable and therefore it needs some sort of control. They're in a way control freaks sitting on top of this neoliberalism agenda -- or trying to sit on top of it and as I think we see they're not being very successful.

SL: You write about the Hungarian economic historian Karl Polanyi who represents a counterpoint to neoliberal economists like Hayek. Polanyi wrote in his book The Great Transformation about a process that he called "the double movement," how when market forces are unleashed on a society eventually they fray the social order to such a point that elites may call for social welfare provisions and restraints on the market, as happened after the upheavals of the great depression and World War II. Do you see any potential amongst elites for that sort of counter-movement?

DH: I think there are signs. You look at the politics of George Soros or somebody like that who seems to me to be moving a little bit in that direction. Even some of the economists who were very strongly in the neoliberal camp at one time, I think of Joseph Stiglitz and Jeffrey Sachs, are now calling for a more institutional approach to how the world economy is going to be orchestrated. They're not neocons. They're trying to come up with some sort of institutional framework that is going to be more about social justice and more about poverty, questions of that kind. I don't agree with the way they've set this up, but I think it's interesting to see how public opinion and some thinking in these circles is beginning to move towards an alternative economic and political framework that can do a better job of creating greater equality in the global system in the future. So there's a movement away from neoliberal orthodoxy right now in certain circles, and I think that movement away is also supported by certain of the political and economic elites.

SL: You argue that US military hegemony and the deficit spending that has accompanied it -- not very neoliberal in fact, although Reagan did the same -- has put the US in a vulnerable position. Explain that vulnerability and whether you see this as imperiling the current political economic order on a global scale.

DH: If you look at the position of the US say in the late 1960s, around 1970, it was dominant in the world of production, it was dominant technologically, it was dominant with respect to global finance, and it was dominant militarily. What has happened under neoliberalization is the US has lost a lot of its dominance in the world of production. Production, its capacity, has disappeared to places like China and the rest of East and Southeast Asia. It's not totally lost it, of course. Technologically the United States still has tremendous power, but that is slipping away very steadily particularly towards East Asia. If you look at the world finance, yes, the US was very powerful in the world of finance in the 1980s and early 1990s. But now you look at the huge deficit that the US has both in terms of its internal budget but also its indebtedness to the rest of the world, and you see that the US is not in such a good position financially. We're actually at a cusp right now: the amount of money the US is going to have to pay out to the rest of the world, in order to fund its debt, is equal to the amount of money that is flowing in from its global operations. So it's no longer a positive thing for the United States to be that. The only thing that the United States has got left where it's really dominant is in terms of its military capacity. But here we also see a limitation, because what Iraq shows is that the United States can dominate from 30,000 feet up but it's not very good at dominating on the ground, it doesn't know how to dominate on the ground. So the US has a rather more limited position than many people like to think, right now, which is not to say that it's subservient to the rest of the world, but it's no longer as dominant as it once was. And I think that also the huge deficits which the US is now running, in relation to the rest of the world but also internally, are indeed a threat to global stability. And this is being said by Paul Volcker and quite conservative people like that and even being said by International Monetary Fund economists, so there is a threat here because I think the US is playing with fire in terms of its current policies.

SL: How might the pressures building up with respect to the US's economic position play out in the next few years?

DH: Well, if I knew that, I'd know where to invest my money! But I'm not sure I'm able to do that. I think that there's going to have to be a major structural adjustment internal within the US. What I did in the book, for example, was to look through the criteria that usually apply to an economy before the IMF steps in and does a structural adjustment. And the United States is doing pretty badly on most of those criteria. So that would mean that in the normal course of events, the IMF would discipline the United States. Well, of course, the US is the IMF, so the problem is that it is not disciplining itself. But the market forces may discipline them, and if the market forces discipline them, then we're going to have some very serious problems. I don't know how that's going to occur, but almost certainly I think it will occur through some sort of shift in how people are investing in the United States and funding the US deficit from abroad.

SL: I'd like to spend the rest of the time we have remaining talking about both what the left can learn from the rise of neoliberalism and problems with the ways the left forms its opposition to it. You make a very interesting argument about how the contradictions of the New Left, following the explosions of social protest in the 1960s and 70s, to some degree allowed for the rise of neoliberal ideas.

DH: The movements of the 1960s can be broadly divided into, for instance, the student movement, which was after much greater liberty, much greater freedom from corporate domination and state domination, and of course was very much against the war policies of the US government and the way in which global capitalism was destroying the environment and so on. So there was that wing of the movement. And then the other wing of the movement was, of course, organized labor and the groups around what you might call more traditional working class organization. The movements of the 1960s had that dual character. During the 1960s they could sort of combine rather uneasily around the idea that individual liberty and freedom and social justice and sustainability and the like were things we were all collectively concerned with. But in some instances there were real schisms within that movement. I think what happened in the 1970s is that when the neoliberal move came in, the idea erupted that, okay, neoliberalism will give you individual liberty and freedom, but you just have to forget social justice and you just have to forget environmental sustainability and all the rest of it. Just think about individual liberty and freedom in particular, and we're going to meet your desires and your interests through the individual liberties of market choice -- freedom of the market is what it's all about. In a sense, there was a response by neoliberals to the sixties movement by saying, we can respond to that aspect about what the sixties was about, but we cannot respond to that other aspect. And I think therefore what we see is a movement in the 1970s where many people who were active in the 1960s were co-opted into the neoliberal train of thinking and neoliberal ways of consumerism as part of how neoliberalization established itself. It is a very broad way of looking at it, but I tend to think that that is what happened. That then leaves us with the question right now, what are we going to do about social justice, what are we going to do about equality, what are we are going to do about environmental sustainability, all those things that neoliberalism cannot confront.

SL: Well, one answer to that today on the left has been to use lawsuits. You're critical of this kind of approach that dominates much of the left and particularly emanates from non-governmental organizations or NGOs. I wonder if you can explain your critique both of the legalistic framework of universal human rights and of non-profits as the agents of change.

DH: I'm not against much of that, I think some of that is okay, but it has limited purchase because it's trying to fight neoliberalism with neoliberalism's own tools. It's attempting to roll back a market ethic by a logic of individual rights, when the market ethic is based on the logic of individual rights. When you start to look at the details, what you find is that, first off, the NGOs are not democratic institutions. There are good NGOs and there are bad NGOs, there is a vast array of NGOs doing very different things. The problem with the rights discourse is that as soon as you get into the judicial world, you find yourself having to actually try to prove things through the law, and the law is not exactly an unbiased institution. It has certain kinds of ways of looking at private property and individuals and so on. For example, I think it's wonderful that in New York City, in Rockefeller Center, there is this bronze plaque where Rockefeller writes his personal credo. And his personal credo says he believes in the supreme worth of the individual. Well, all of us should know that legally the corporation is an individual. So maybe we should go out there and say, do you realize that what Rockefeller means here is that he believes in the supreme worth of the corporation? And so when I go into court and I take on a corporation, there is an asymmetry of power in this whole system. And this even works at the world level. For instance, if the state of Chad doesn't like the fact that the United States is disobeying WTO rules in its subsidies to the cotton farms of this country, Chad has to mount a case against the United States, but in order to do this, it needs at least a million dollars. But the budget of Chad is very small, so a million dollars out of the budget Chad is huge, whereas a million dollars out of the budget of the US is almost nothing. So Chad cannot afford to actually mount a campaign against the United States in the WTO and claim its rights under the WTO. This is the sort of problem we run into at all levels: as soon as you go into the legal system there is an asymmetry of power and the like. While I'm not against some of those things that are going on through the pursuit of human rights, what I'm saying is that there is limited purchase to that. What we have to look at is construction of alternative forms of social and political organization, social solidarities, and we have to really reevaluate what is meant by democracy and what is really meant by freedom. I don't think the world is free if there's no healthcare. I don't think the world is free if we have to pay immense amounts for what should be public education. I think the current questions are what is freedom, what is democracy, how social solidarities can be built -- those are the issues we should really be concentrating upon in terms of left politics.

SL: Moving away from the idea of universal human rights, which in your book you mention have been used to justify all sorts of imperial excursions, I wonder if, on the other hand, you don't think there is equally the danger of the left celebrating fragmentation, in effect making a virtue out of weakness by elevating the notion of a multiplicity of struggles, which a lot of times is connected to the idea of changing society without taking power. Doesn't this approach in some ways parallel neoliberalism with its celebration of diffuse difference?

DH: Yes, I object very much to that angle of left thinking these days that says, let us just simply rely upon all the local, specific movements here, there, and everywhere, to somehow or other generate a complete change in the world without confronting state power. I think this plays into the hands of the neoliberal ethic, and I think it plays into the hands of the neocon use of neoliberal tactics in its own pursuit of power. I think that it is disempowering for the left to take that line of approach. But again I think we also do have to recognize -- and this is what I really am concerned about in my book and elsewhere -- a tremendous diversity of struggles which are going on out there: struggles against dam construction in India, or the struggles of the landless peasant movements in Brazil, the struggles going in Bolivia, the struggles going on in Venezuela, the struggles going on in Sweden, the struggles going on in Paris right now. All of these struggles are very specific and we have to acknowledge their diversity and appreciate their diversity. I don't think it's a matter of saying to people, forget your specific struggles and join the universal proletariat in motion; I don't think that's what it's about at all. What we have to do is to find a way of politically uniting those struggles, and that's why I think something like the concept of neoliberalism and its penchant for accumulation by dispossession provide a kind of vocabulary to start to bring together those struggles around a more general kind of theme. So that an Iowa farmer who's just lost his farm can understand how a Mexican peasant feels, can understand how the struggles going on in China are parallel, so we start to see a certain unity in all of the struggles, at the same time as we acknowledge their specificity.

SL: Taking the example you gave of the Iowa farmer and the Mexican peasant: on the one hand, you could say that we need an umbrella that can unite people as disparate as these groups across the world. But then doesn't that gloss over the divisions that exist, say, when the Mexican peasant ends up as a farm worker and works on the farm of that Iowa farmer. Can't the attempt to have this broad umbrella of movement of movements make for strange alliances on the left?

DH: It can and indeed I'm not arguing for a nostalgia for things past, that nothing should change -- the famous Maoist adage that you can't make an omelet without breaking eggs. And so any kind of revolutionary movement has to be prepared I think to undertake some major transformations. But one of the things I think is interesting is that a lot of movements that are peasant movements or something of that kind are not against modernization, are not against transformation. What they are interested in is that they get some benefits from it. And if you look at the dispossession of the Mexican peasant or even the dispossession of the Iowa farmer, it's one thing to say that the reorganization of society is such that you have to give up your traditional ways of doing things and doing things in a very different way, it's one thing to say that. It's another thing to say, you're going to give up all your rights and you're going to lose to the point that you just become a disposable person. And I think the struggles going on, for instance, the landless peasant movement in Brazil or the movements against the Narmada dam in India, are not on the part of people who do not want change. They are people who want change, who are interested in modernization, interested in new technologies, interested in doing things in a different kind of way, interested in decent healthcare and decent education, and things of that kind. But what they are concerned about is that they are losing everything or being deprived of things in such a way that they do not get any benefits at all from it. And that is what encourages me to think that there is more unity here than simply people saying, I want to defend my ancient ways and I don't want to be disturbed. Actually you find very little of that going on. That is a sort of romantic construction which it seems to me is present in certain segments of the left, rather than actually amongst populations themselves. I think a lot of populations want development, they want development on their terms, they want development that benefits them and not the corporations and not the elites around Wall Street.

SL: Right, but zeroing in on the issue of class, which obviously plays a very important role in your argument, you're talking about alliances of people, who, while they may have similar interests in opposing, say, the influence or domination of corporations, may not have the same class interest amongst themselves.

DH: Well, you don't build a movement based on the divisions, you try to build a movement which incorporates difference, at the same time as it tries to recognize that in order to get something to happen, we have to transcend those divisions. For example, in this country, I think if you asked the question, who would benefit from a universal healthcare system? I think the answer would be, it would go across all groups -- men and women, gays and straights, ethnic minorities, religious groups of different kinds -- so you have a universal project, which is a universal healthcare system, within which there would be a variety of problems about how you designed it. You could design it to be sensitive to difference, but nevertheless the universality of it is something that seems to me could come out of many, many different groups getting together and saying, yes, we'll get behind that. Then you would need a political movement, a political organization, around universal healthcare, which means a political party that is going to advocate it in some way, bring it through Congress, pass legislation, which you would not get from remaining fragmented. And it's that kind of transcendence of the particularities and the willingness to move to the universal level which seems to me to be absolutely crucial in politics right now, which a lot of the left is reluctant to do.

Το Βήμα, 01.03.1998

Ανταύγειες λογοτεχνικότητας

Δ. ΜΗΤΡΟΠΟΥΛΟΣ | Κυριακή 1 Μαρτίου 1998



ΠΑΡΙΣΙ, 28 Φεβρουαρίου.

ΕΝΙΟΤΕ οι περιπλανήσεις ξεκινούν από το λεξικό. Το γαλλικό ρήμα «flaner» αποδίδει, σύμφωνα με το «Petit Robert», το «να περιφέρεται κανείς χωρίς βιασύνη, αφήνοντας τον εαυτό του στις εντυπώσεις και στις εικόνες κάθε στιγμής». Στον «επαρκή αναγνώστη» (κατά Μονταίνιο και, πλησιέστερα στα καθ' ημάς, κατά Σεφέρη) ο ήχος αλλά και η σημασία της λέξης θυμίζει Προυστ. Αν μάλιστα μια πόλη «δέχεται χωρίς κανένα χάσμα» τον προαναφερθέντα συνειρμό, αυτή είναι το Παρίσι.

Σε πείσμα της αντιποιητικής εποχής μας (αλλά και της γενικευμένης γκρίνιας για την οικονομική πολιτική του πρωθυπουργού Λιονέλ Ζοσπέν) η «Πόλη του Φωτός» διατηρεί ακέραιες τις λογοτεχνικές της συνδηλώσεις ­ και ας έχει περιθωριοποιηθεί η γαλλική γλώσσα μέσα στον σύγχρονο αγγλοαμερικανικό ωκεανό. Ασφαλώς, αν το καλοσκεφθεί κανείς, εν έτει 1998, η «λογοτεχνικότητα» του Παρισιού δεν έχει πρόσωπο. Κακά τα ψέματα, τα μεγάλα ονόματα της σύγχρονης διεθνούς λογοτεχνίας (ο Πολ Οστερ, ο Αντόνιο Ταμπούκι, ο Κάρλος Φουέντες) δεν είναι γαλλικής υπηκοότητας· δεν είναι καν βέβαιο ότι περνούν από το Παρίσι συχνότερα από το Λονδίνο ­ πόσο μάλλον από τη Νέα Υόρκη.

Εντούτοις, η μητρόπολη που διασχίζει ο Σηκουάνας έχει έναν αέρα λογοτεχνικό, τον οποίο οι προαναφερθείσες «κοσμοπόλεις» δεν μπορούν να συναγωνισθούν. Είναι οι φιλολογικές αναφορές που γεννούν οι στιγμές της παρισινής καθημερινότητας. Το αστραφτερό γέλιο μιας μελαχρινής παριζιάνας στην brasserie «Balzar» της Rue des Ecoles, κοντά στη Σορβόννη, θυμίζει στίχο του Πολ Ελιάρ. Οι κήποι του Λουξεμβούργου ζωντανεύουν τον Σαρλ Σουάν και τον νεανικό έρωτα του αφηγητή της «Αναζήτησης του Χαμένου Χρόνου» για την κοκκινομάλλα («rousse») Ζιλμπέρτ. Τα βουλεβάρτα του Παρισιού θυμίζουν Φλομπέρ της «Αισθηματικής Αγωγής» και Χέμινγκγουεϊ της «Κινούμενης»· Φιτζέραλντ του «Τρυφερή είναι η νύχτα» και ­ γιατί όχι; ­ Εμπειρίκο του «Ο Βασιλιάς ο Κονγκ».

Η απαρίθμηση είναι, αναμφιβόλως, ενδεικτική· το λογοτεχνικό Παρίσι ­ η αίσθησή του ­ στριμώχνεται δύσκολα σε έναν βιβλιογραφικό κατάλογο. Αρκεί να πει κανείς ότι οι αντανακλάσεις στις βιτρίνες της «αριστερής όχθης» έχουν λογοτεχνικά χρώματα· ότι το φευγαλέο σούρσιμο μιας γκαμπαρντίνας φέρνει εξ ορισμού στον νου την ιντελιγκέντσια ­ ενώ στο Λονδίνο και στη Νέα Υόρκη οφείλεται στο βιαστικό περπάτημα ενός από τους γιάπις της χρηματαγοράς.

Κοντολογίς, το Παρίσι, πόλη ιστορημένη χίλιες φορές στις σελίδες της λογοτεχνίας, μεταμορφώνει ή, διαφορετικά ειπωμένο, προσδίδει ένα είδος «φιλολογικής υπεραξίας» στην καθημερινότητα. Εντούτοις, η ιδιότητα αυτή δεν οφείλεται μόνο στο πλούσιο παρελθόν της πόλης αλλά και στο στατικό παρόν της. Σε αντίθεση με τη Νέα Υόρκη ή το Λονδίνο, τον Αγιο Φραγκίσκο ή το Τόκιο, η «Πόλη του Φωτός» δεν βρίσκεται στο επίκεντρο των εξελίξεων της ψηφιακής παγκοσμιοποιημένης εποχής μας. Η βιαιότητα του νέου δεν έρχεται να απειλήσει τη λάμψη του παλαιού ή μάλλον το λυκόφως της λογοτεχνικότητας.

http://www.thelemming.com/lemming/dissertation-web/home/flaneur.html , 17.02.2009


The Flâneur

"'Man as civilized being, as intellectual nomad, is again wholly microcosmic, wholly homeless, as free intellectually as hunter and herdsman were free sensually.' Spengler, vol. 2 p. 125" (AP 806)

"Taking a walk is a haeccity . . . Haecceity, fog, glare. A haecceity has neither beginning nor end, origin nor destination; it is always in the middle. It is not made of points, only of lines. It is a rhizome". (1000 P 263)


"Flâneur" is a word understood intuitively by the French to mean "stroller, idler, walker." He has been portrayed in the past as a well-dressed man, strolling leisurely through the Parisian arcades of the nineteenth century--a shopper with no intention to buy, an intellectual parasite of the arcade. Traditionally the traits that mark the flâneur are wealth, education, and idleness. He strolls to pass the time that his wealth affords him, treating the people who pass and the objects he sees as texts for his own pleasure. An anonymous face in the multitude, the flâneur is free to probe his surroundings for clues and hints that may go unnoticed by the others.

As a member of the crowd that populates the streets, the flâneur participates physically in the text that he observes while performing a transient and aloof autonomy with a "cool but curious eye" that studies the constantly changing spectacle that parades before him (Rignall 112). As an observer, the flâneur exists as both "active and intellectual" (Burton 1). As a literary device, one may understand him as a narrator who is fluent in the hieroglyphic vocabulary of visual culture. When he assumes the form of narrator, he plays both protagonist and audience--like a commentator who stands outside of the action, of whom only the reader is aware, "float[ing] freely in the present tense" (Mellencamp 60).

The flâneur has no specific relationship with any individual, yet he establishes a temporary, yet deeply empathetic and intimate relationship with all that he sees--an intimacy bordering on the conjugal--writing a bit of himself into the margins of the text in which he is immersed, a text devised by selective disjunction.

Walter Benjamin posits in his description of the flâneur that "Empathy is the nature of the intoxication to which the flâneur abandons himself in the crowd. He . . . enjoys the incomparable privilege of being himself and someone else as he sees fit. Like a roving soul in search of a body, he enters another person whenever he wishes" (Baudelaire 55). In this way the flâneur parasite, dragging the crowd for intellectual food--or material for his latest novel (Ponikwer 139-140). In so doing, he wanders through a wonderland of his own construction, imposing himself upon a shop window here, a vagrant here, and an advertisement here. He flows like thought through his physical surroundings, walking in a meditative trance, (Lopate 88), gazing into the passing scene as others have gazed into campfires, yet "remain[ing] alert and vigilant" all the while (Missac 61) .

The flâneur is the link between routine perambulation, in which a person is only half-awake, making his way from point A to point B, and the moments of chiasmic epiphany that one reads of in Wordsworth or Joyce. Like Poe’s narrators, he is acutely aware, a potent intellectual force of keen observation--a detective without a lead. If he were cast a character in the "drama of the world," he would be its consciousness.

There is little scholarship surrounding the subject of the flâneur that does not in some way refer to Benjamin's writings on Baudelaire or The Arcades Project. This character first appeared in Benjamin's work in 1929 in "Die Wiederkeht des Flâneur," a work reviewing Hessel's Spazieren in Berlin, the title of which "suggests that the flâneur is properly a creature of the past". In his later work on nineteenth-century Paris, however, Benjamin re-examines the figure in what he deems its true dwelling place: Paris.

The flâneur figures prominently in his 1935 sketch for The Arcades Project, "Paris--Capital of the Nineteenth Century" and in the two studies of Baudelaire written in 1938 (Rignall 113). Much of Benjamin's research into the flâneur was inspired by the work of George Simmel, who notes that the relationships between members of a large city are more deeply influenced by the activity of the eye than of the ear. His interest in the surrealist movement of the early twentieth century also played a crucial part in his development of the flâneur as a literary concept. Combining "the casual eye of the stroller with the purposeful gaze of the detective" (Rignall 113), Benjamin constructs a literary creature capable of seeing the city as "landscape, lying either desolately or seductively open before the fictional characters, and . . . as a room enclosing them either protectively or oppressively" (Rignall 113). In this context, the city for Benjamin is both an interior and an exterior, "knowable and known, and . . . mysteriously alien and fantastic" (Rignall 113-114). Benjamin collected notes and reflections from mid 1927-1929 in preparation for an article-length essay to be titled "Paris Arcades: A Dialectical Enchantment." In response to the surrounding surrealist influences of the time, Benjamin's "ambition was to read the arcades as phantasmagorical images, 'the hollow mold' from which the image of the 'modern' was cast" (McCole 229); this would place the flâneur in its twentieth-century incarnation, as a product of surrealism; however, Benjamin disagreed with much of the surrealists' theory of images, which, in his opinion, "remain[ed] ensnared in pernicious romantic prejudices that left them prey to the mythic forces they had discovered" (McCole 229). Regardless of Benjamin's perception into the intellectual shortcomings of his surrealist contemporaries, Benjamin's study of Aragon and the architectural theories of his time influenced his work with the flâneur a great deal, allowing him to examine the resident mythologies of the modern city while preserving "fresh antitoxins against the vitalist strains of romanticism" (McCole 231). His favorite flâneur was Charles Baudelaire, who in his poem "A une passante," perhaps best articulates the relationship between the flâneur and the inhabitants of his city. (See section on "A une passante" by clicking HERE.)

Charles Baudelaire begins with a chapter on the flâneur. Benjamin commences his argument with a discussion of the rise of the physiologie as a literary genre. He refers to these "modest-looking, paperbound, pocket-sized volumes" as examples of "panorama literature" devised to orient the individual in the market-place in light of all the social changes brought on by the French Revolution (Baudelaire 35), while remaining "innocuous" enough and safely within the demands of the September Laws, which tightened censorship in 1836 (Baudelaire 36). These little books examined "types" that one might encounter while walking around Paris; from "the itinerant street vendor of the boulevards to the dandy in the foyer of the opera-house, there was not a figure of Paris life that was not sketched by a physiologue" (Baudelaire 35). They went by titles such as "Paris la nu it, Paris à table, Paris dans l'eau, Paris à cheval, Paris pittoresque, Paris marié" (Baudelaire 36). Benjamin notes that in "1841, there were seventy-six new physiologies. After that year the genre declined, and it disappeared altogether with the reign of the citizen-king Louis-Philippe" (Baudelaire 35-36). Benjamin dismisses these writings as "a basically petty-bourgeois genre" (Baudelaire 36) that was somewhat "socially dubious": "The long series of eccentric or simple, attractive or severe figures which the physiologies presented to the public in character sketches had one thing in common: they were harmless and of perfect bonhomie" (Baudelaire 37).

These booklets attempted to articulate the textual representation of flânerie, while at the same time giving people "a friendly picture of one another" (Baudelaire 38). The governing principle behind these works was the idea that a person could be sized-up in a glance: "If that sort of thing could be done, then, to be sure, life in the big city was not nearly so disquieting as it probably seemed to people" (Baudelaire 39). However, their superficiality and safe adherence to the black-and-white prevented them from fitting the role of the flâneur as Benjamin defines it.

According to Benjamin, the flâneur came to rise primarily because of an architectural change in the city of Paris. This change, which was rooted in budding capitalism, involved the creation of the arcades, which were passageways through neighborhoods which had been covered with a glass roof and braced by marble panels so as to create a sort of interior-exterior for vending purposes. These passages were "lined with the most elegant shops, so that such an arcade is a city, even a world in miniature" (Baudelaire 36-37). Within these arcades, the flâneur is capable of finding a remedy for the ever-threatening ennui. He is able to stroll at leisure; one might even go to the extreme of allowing a pet turtle to set his pace, observing the people, the building facades, the objects for sale--entertaining and enriching his mind with the secret language of the city (Baudelaire 36-37). The flâneur is completely at home in this cross between interior and exterior worlds because his own personal interior-exterior boundaries are also ambiguous:

To him the shiny, enameled signs of

businesses are at least as good a wall

ornament as an oil painting is to a bourgeois

in his salon. The walls are the desk against

which he presses his notebooks; news-

stands are his libraries and the terraces of

cafés are the balconies from which he looks

down on his household after his work is

done. (Baudelaire 37)

According to Benjamin, the flâneur disappeared as the commercial world slowly deserted the interior-exteriors of arcades for the carpeted, artificially lit department stores that were to replace them: "If in the beginning the street had become an intérieur for him, now this intérieur turned into a street, and he roamed though the labyrinth of merchandise as he had once roamed though the labyrinth of the city" (Baudelaire 54).

The physical placement of the traditional flâneur in a setting that is an interior-exterior or an exterior-interior is essential to its significance in literary analysis. The flâneur's dual interior-exterior nature, his ability to be both active and intellectual, to be reading the past of the city while existing entirely in the present, and his manner of coloring the landscape with a bit of his own psyche places the flâneur at the center point of a whirlwind of contradictions. The manner in which the flâneur resolves the opposing stimuli that pelt him from every which way, while maintaining an aloof, yet empathic perspective of his surroundings--always alone in the crowd--makes him a powerful literary device that is capable of outdoing the omniscient narrator in objectivity and the first-person narrator in intimacy. The flâneur is like a ghost who is physically manifest in the material world, but not opaquely. His translucent personality, like a phantom, haunts his own narrative, leaving a tinge of himself, of his latent, repressed personality, on every detail of his interior-exterior universe, as though he were leaping into and out of his surroundings.

The flâneur may be a ghost in more ways than one: for Benjamin he may be a cold, dead thing from an epoch of old. However, the death of Benjamin's flâneur in the sterile capitalist wastelands of department stores does not necessarily mean the death of the flâneur for everyone else. Because Benjamin's flâneur is weighted with such political and socioeconomic importance, being as he is an icon of bourgeois "conspicuous leisure," the critic does not apply the concept to later literary figures who may have merited the same title, nor does he examine in much detail its manifestation in American literature outside of Edgar A. Poe.


The Arcades Project Project is part of Heather Marcelle Crickenberger's doctoral dissertation entitled "The Structure of Awakening": Walter Benjamin and Progressive Scholarship in New Media which was defended and passed on June 27, 2007 at the University of South Carolina. The committe members are as follows: John Muckelbauer, Ph.D, Judith James, Ph.D., Dan Smith, Ph.D, Brad Collins, Ph. D., and Anthony Jarrells, Ph.D. Copyright 2007 by Heather Marcelle Crickenberger.